U.S. Strategy in the Changing Arctic Region

The growing strategic importance of the Arctic region is widely recognized across the U.S. government, including the military as well as other governmental departments. This growing importance is evident in the number of new and updated Arctic strategy documents that have been issued in recent years.

U.S. Goals in the Arctic Region

At the highest level of national strategy, U.S. strategy for the Arctic region was updated by the Biden Administration in 2022, reflecting a mix of ongoing concerns and new priorities following Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Released in October, the 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic Region (NSAR) lays out the US strategy for the next decade.2 Like many of the other Arctic nations, the United States’ vision for the Arctic is that the region remains peaceful, stable, prosperous, and cooperative. As both the physical and geopolitical climate of the Arctic rapidly evolve, the United States continues to reevaluate and update its strategic approach.
Naturally, the NSAR identifies the protection of the American people and the sovereign territory of the United States as the highest priority. The NSAR emphasizes the importance of homeland defense and security with the security benefit of deepening cooperation with U.S. allies, particularly in shared technology and joint training. With Russia and others continuing to undermine the global rules-based order, there is a heightened need for the United States to work closely with allies and partners to ensure approaches to shared challenges are coordinated. Interoperability and close dialogue are paramount in presenting a unified front against those who would undermine stability and the rules-based order in the Arctic.

The National Strategy acknowledges a need for better understanding of the Arctic environment and notes that insufficient domain awareness can weaken a deterrence strategy. To improve the understanding of the Arctic operating environment, the strategy asserts that the United States will invest significantly in modernizing existing domain awareness capabilities, improve sensing and observational capabilities, develop communications and data networks operable in the northern latitudes, and improve climate-related forecasting and emergency preparedness posture.
Advancing military presence in the Arctic is fundamental to supporting the United States’ goals of homeland defense and power projection in support of deterrence. The National Strategy for the Arctic Region maintains that consistent, transparent training exercises, including with allies and partners, and strategic investments to expand the existing security infrastructure and extend the reach of the U.S. in the Arctic will fulfill objectives of defending the homeland and deterring potential adversaries.

Defense and Military Arctic Strategy

The U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) and the military services also have their own specific Arctic strategy documents. While the current Department of Defense Arctic Strategy is a few years older than the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, the goals of the plan are in lock step with the national-level strategy. The 2019 DoD Arctic Strategy outlined three primary objectives for the DoD’s approach to the Arctic: defend the homeland, compete when necessary to maintain favorable regional balances of power, and ensure common domains remain free and open.3 The DoD is finishing a new Arctic strategy document at present, and is expected to issue this document in early 2024. The new DoD Arctic strategy is not expected to make significant changes to existing strategic lines of effort, but to account for the impact of Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine and resulting shifts in the Arctic security context.

In line with the National Strategy for the Arctic Region, DoD emphasizes the need for enhancing domain awareness in the Arctic to ensure homeland defense aerospace warning, aerospace control, maritime warning, and missile defense mechanisms remain effective. Cooperation with Arctic partners and allies is instrumental to these goals. For example, Canada and the United States frequently collaborate to evaluate the status of defense operations and find shared solutions to common vulnerabilities, some of which include a lack of reliable communications systems and data networks in the high northern latitudes.

Enhancing the U.S. military’s Arctic operability requires regular exercises—independent, bilateral, or multilateral—and deployments in the region. Each time the United States participates in large-scale joint exercises allows the Joint Force to gain familiarity with the operating environment of the Arctic while simultaneously coordinating efforts across allied forces to respond to shared threats or issues. The United States will also continue to pre-position defense equipment and supplies throughout the range of Arctic allied and partner nations to promote operational flexibility and rapid contingency response.

Beyond improving Arctic operability, close cooperation with Arctic allies and partners bolsters the existing regional rules-based order. Functioning as a likeminded defensive network, the United States and its security partners can operationalize deterrence strategies collectively, which is much more effective in dissuading aggressive acts than deterrence from a single actor. Specific opportunities for allied cooperation at the diplomatic level include hosting defense engagement forums, participation in NORDEFCO and Northern Group-led forums, and the implementation of joint statements of intent. Militarily, the United States seeks to learn from the highly capable allied Arctic forces like Norway’s, which are much more familiar with the Arctic operating environment that the majority of the U.S. Joint Force.

The United States Air and Space Forces are the most heavily engaged in the Arctic of the six United States military branches, as the vast nature of the United States’ Arctic territory and lack of infrastructure makes Alaska exceptionally dependent on air and space power. The United States Air Force holds the same desired end-state of the Arctic as the Department of Defense: “A secure and stable region where U.S. national interests are safeguarded, the homeland is protected, and nations address shared challenges cooperatively”. The U.S. Air Force delineates four lines of effort in its 2020 Arctic strategy: vigilance, power projection, cooperation, and preparation.4

Arctic Geography and U.S. Military Interests

The Arctic Ocean straddles three major U.S. military combatant commands, and therefore the overarching strategic approach has different specific implications across the different regions.
The U.S. Department of Defense divides the globe into six regions, which each have a Combatant Command to provide command and control of military forces: Africa Command (USAFRICOM), Central Command (USCENTCOM), European Command (USEUCOM), Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM), Northern Command (USNORTHCOM), and Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM). In addition, there are 5 functional commands. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigns missions, planning, training, and operational responsibilities to the COCOMs.
In the Arctic region, three of these geographic COCOMs meet: USEUCOM, USNORTHCOM, and USINDOPACOM. Alaska bases deliver air and space support to an incredibly wide range of U.S. commands: the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command and U.S. European Command simultaneously pull from Eielson AFB and JBER. In joint exercise Northern Edge 23-2, four F-35 aircraft from Eielson AFB joined allied forces after a ten-hour flight from Fairbanks, marking the first time F-35s have flown directly from a North American home base into the first island chain for a tactical training mission.5 The Arctic is at the periphery of these three COCOMs, but plays an important role in them all. The major in-theater priorities are quite different.

U.S. European Command is responsible for US military operations across Europe, portions of Asia and the Middle East, as well as the Atlantic and Arctic Oceans. This COCOM is heavily focused on the ongoing war in Ukraine and cooperation with NATO. The NATO dimensions of Arctic security are of primary importance to USEUCOM, as well as the Barents and GIUK Gap areas, or what is often referred to as the High North. With the expansion of NATO to include Finland and (hopefully soon) Sweden, the Alliance has been greatly strengthened in the Arctic.

Growing NATO interest in the Arctic was reflected in the 2023 Vilnius Communique, which noted that Russia “maintains significant military capabilities in the Arctic” and described Russia’s ability to generate adverse effects in the North Atlantic as “a strategic challenge to the Alliance.”6 The Communique stated, “NATO and Allies will continue to undertake necessary, calibrated, and coordinated activities, including by exercising relevant plans.”
Greenland falls within the USEUCOM area of responsibility as it is part of the Kingdom of Denmark. Pituffik Space Base in Greenland (formerly Thule Air Base) is the northernmost installation of the U.S. Department of Defense, operated by the 821st Space Base Group and part of Space Base Delta 1. The base supports missile warning, missile defense, and space surveillance missions through phased-array radar. The Pituffik Tracking Station, one of seven Remote Tracking Stations in the Satellite Control Network, provides satellite command and control. The U.S. and Denmark have fostered a close-knit strategic partnership for collective defense, with USEUCOM’s Deputy Director for Strategy, Plans, and Capabilities USAF Brig. Gen. Byrony Terrell referring to Denmark as “a cornerstone of America’s transatlantic defense and a key partner in addressing the Arctic’s evolving security environment” in the annual military staff talks between the two countries in September of this year.7 In January of 2023, the U.S. held its first F-35 aircraft deployment to Pituffik Space Base.

U.S. Northern Command is tasked with detection and defeat of threats to the United States, and its top priority is the homeland defense mission. USNORTHCOM also conducts security cooperation activities, and supports civil authorities during natural disaster or similar events. From a homeland defense perspective, effective threat detection, targeting and tracking, consistent communications networks, and—to the extent possible—reliable forecasting models are necessary in the Arctic. The commander of USNORTHCOM is dual-hatted as the commander of the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), a binational command that is responsible for aerospace warning and control and maritime warning for North America. The NORAD/NORTHCOM combined strategy states that “Both Russia and China are increasing their activity in the Arctic,” along with highlighting new missile technology that poses a threat via the northern approaches to North America.8 NORAD is dependent on radar systems to detect adversary air threats early enough to defend against them. However, the current North Warning System radars are aging as adversaries quickly advance their own capabilities to be longer-ranging, more precise, and have lower radar cross-sections.9 In 2022, Canada announced a $38.6 billion plan to modernize NORAD over the next two decades, exemplifying the value of the joint command to the defense of North America.10 U.S. improvements to Arctic missile defense continue as part of a larger effort to modernize the ground-based midcourse defense system, including long-range discrimination radar and ground-based interceptors in Alaska.11

Conclusion: How the Arctic Fits into U.S. Priorities

It is noteworthy that the term “calibrated” is in widespread use in both NATO and US official language on activities and posture in the Arctic. Notably, the term is used in the U.S. National Strategy for the Arctic Region, in the U.S. National Defense Strategy, and in the NATO Vilnius Communique. The Vilnius Communique and the NSAR both declare that “calibrated and coordinated” activities to be the way of pursuing strategic objectives. The term calibrated is used here to mean carefully assessed and set. The use of this term is helpful in reminding readers that the Arctic region remains stable, and that stability should not be undermined in the pursuit of deterrence.
Another major theme that is evident across the strategy documents is the recognition of the value of multilateral approaches to common Arctic challenges. NATO is one important vehicle for cooperation, as are smaller groupings of likeminded nations. The U.S. is fortunate to have strong bilateral relationships with most Arctic nations. Norway is a close ally and, like others, has an advanced and highly capable military.

Cooperation with Arctic allies and partners is critical for Arctic domain awareness, interoperability, and deterrence. Arctic allies and partners have long experience in the harsh conditions of the Arctic, as well as proximity to the key areas like the GIUK gap and the Barents, from which the United States could enhance its own domain awareness and improve its Arctic operability. For example, the U.S. Air Force Arctic Strategy calls for the development of interoperable systems with not only other U.S. military services, but with the services of allies and partners. Shared technology and networks increase the rapidity of contingency response and improve internationally coordinated operations.
NATO routinely operates in the Arctic and the United States’ Arctic allies and partners actively participate in NATO activities. The United States routinely cooperates with North Atlantic allies to conduct anti-submarine warfare (ASW) patrols along the GIUK gap, and a number of recent operations and exercises have been conducted in various groupings in the Barents Sea and nearby waters.

The U.S. continues to juggle multiple competing priorities around the world, including a bipartisan consensus on the challenge posed by China, Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine, and the recent crisis in Israel and Gaza. While there is an important Arctic dimension to the problems posed by Russia and China—especially Russia, given its strategic interests and terrain in the Arctic—there is benefit to stability in the region.12 And the U.S. is clearly interested in partnering with allies like Norway to pursue shared objectives, as well as working through the NATO alliance. Continuing to build operational familiarity in the Arctic, and working through exercises, operations, and domain awareness to support the rules-based order in the Arctic, are shared priorities. Ensuring that these activities are carefully considered in order to avoid unnecessary escalation is key, and will be an important element of dialogue.