Sustaining the case for European sovereign air capability

Putting aside the creation and comparative health of European missile house MBDA, built on a Franco-British core long-predating the support it has garnered Lancaster House, there is scant else to trumpet for defence aerospace. The UK’s defence and security relationship with the rest of Europe is being strained by Britain’s messy withdrawal from the European Union and the acrimonious nature of some of the discussions.

Fragmentation

What was meant to be the flagship Franco-British defence aerospace project, known as the Future Combat Air System (FCAS) project, instead unravelled. While British Prime Minister Boris Johnson suggested the Franco-British defence and security partnership was ‘stronger than ever’, in terms of future combat air platform there is no partnership. Instead London and Paris are again leading rival camps to develop multi-role fighter aircraft to replace their current inventories.

France is fronting a team with Germany and Spain on what continues to be called FCAS, or SCAF to give its French acronym. The UK is leading Italy and Sweden on what is called Tempest, after a former Defence Minister had christened the nascent combat aircraft project with the industrial consortium name, to the surprise of some industrialists.
This fragmentation was arguably what the defence-aerospace element of the Lancaster House Treaty was intended to try to avoid. Nicolas Sarkozy shortly after being elected as French President in 2007 noted that Europe could not afford again the ‘luxury’ of three combat aircraft programmes, referring to the Dassault Rafale, Eurofighter Typhoon and Saab Gripen. Underpinning Sarkozy’s comments was concern as to how France and Europe could sustain a sovereign combat air capability at the industrial and at the operational levels. It is a conundrum that Europe’s main military powers have struggled with since the end of the Cold War.

Over a decade on from Sarkozy’s remark, the issue remains unresolved, but is now more pressing since in the ensuing years Europe’s security environment has worsened. Relations with Russia have deteriorated to the extent that armed confrontation while still remote no longer appears an impossibility. In most if not all conflict scenarios air power would be critical. Russia’s Aerospace Forces (VKS) have benefitted from a near decade of increased investment with upgraded types of combat aircraft and weapons entering the inventory. While development of the Su-57 Felon multi-role fighter is far behind the original schedule, the Su-35S Flanker M development of the Su-27 Flanker family provides a credible interim with just under 100 now in service. The Su-34 Fullback A, with over 120 now in service, similarly offers the VKS a capable air-to-surface platform.

European Air Forces in the face of a more assertive Moscow

So, what does this continuing fragmentation mean for Europe capacity to generate air power in the face of a more assertive Moscow? In the short term the answer is very little, if not nothing. Big ticket defence aerospace programmes, sometime to the frustration of those involved and the consternation of their political paymasters, can take the better part of a quarter of a century to get from requirements capture to front-line service. European air forces today field mainly what are described in short-hand as fourth-generation fighter aircraft, either from European or US manufacturers. Some are also are beginning to operate combat air fleets of fourth and fifth-generation combat aircraft, the latter provided by the US F-35 Lightning II. Italy, Norway, and the UK have begun to field the aircraft, the Netherlands is taking delivery, the first Danish aircraft will be delivered in 2021, and the first Belgian aircraft in 2023.

Two variants of the F-35 are being by European aircraft, the F-35A and the F-35B short take-off and vertical landing model. Designed from the outset to be low-observable, the aircraft offers a capable air-to-surface platform with a secondary air-to-air role.

The F-35 was also being considered by Germany as at least a partial successor the Panavia Tornado but was ruled out on what would appear to have been political and defence-industrial grounds. The German air force Tornado is declared to NATO in the dual-capable role for nuclear deterrence. Given the survivability characteristics of the F-35, and that the B-61-12 nuclear free fall bomb is being integrated on the aircraft, to some at least it appeared an obvious choice. The then German Air Force chief supported the acquisition of a fifth-generation aircraft, clearly the F-35, and for his troubles found he was not to be extended in post by 12 months. Instead Berlin in April 2020 indicated it would order the F/A-18F Super Hornet to meet this role. The F/A-18E/F, while a capable multi-role fighter, is not a low-observable design and as such would be at greater risk in penetrating highly defended air space than the F-35. Nonetheless Berlin opted for the former, prompted by concerns in Paris that the selection of the F-35 by its FCAS partner would undermine the project. There remains a tension between operational and industrial drivers at the national and supra-national level among Europe’s remaining defence aerospace manufacturers which have and continue to risk a sub-optimal outcome in terms of European cooperation.

For the front-line operator the intricacies of defence-aerospace cooperation are tomorrow’s challenge, more immediate is the problem of an increasingly abrasive competitor state on Europe’s eastern borders. Conventional deterrence today is provided by what is already in, or entering the inventory, rather than the promise of the next decade’s aircraft. As previously noted, European combat air power will be generated by a mix of ‘fourth’ and ‘fifth’-generation aircraft at least to the middle of this century. For the majority of the next two decades the only ‘fifth’- generation aircraft in the European inventory will be the F-35. The French-led next-generation fighter is not anticipated to enter the inventory until around 2040, while the UK’s Tempest target in-service date is 2035 or as close as possible thereafter.

The F-16 European Participating Forces nations, Belgium, Denmark, Netherlands, and Norway will all transition to an F-35 only fleet. Italy and the UK, meanwhile, will operate the F-35 alongside the Eurofighter Typhoon likely at least until the early 2040s. In the case of the UK the F-35B provides the Royal Navy with the offensive air element of its carrier strike capability.

The Royal Navy’s two aircraft carriers, HMS Queen Elizabeth and HMS Prince of Wales are sometimes viewed as providing a core military element of what the government terms ‘global Britain.’ For the near term the focus, however, may need more often to be far closer to home waters.

The deterioration of relations between the NATO alliance and Russia, while not a return to the Cold War, there is for instance no Warsaw Pact, is seeing the re-emergence of areas of previous strategic importance. These include the North Atlantic and the Norwegian sea. During the Cold War these were of particular focus for Oslo and for London within the Alliance framework. As a response to Russia’s growing assertiveness this is again the case today.

Common platforms

Unlike the Cold War, however, Norwegian and British combat air power now have platforms in common, notably the F-35 and the P-8A Poseidon anti-submarine warfare aircraft. Following the decision to scrap the Nimrod MRA4 maritime patrol and anti-submarine warfare aircraft in 2010, the UK gapped this capability. Development problems with the aircraft, wider budgetary issues, and the perceived level of risk in accepting a capability gap in what had previously been deemed key, led to the MRA4 cancellation. While the Nimrod was a domestic programme, there was scant consideration given to a national or cooperative development programme when considering a successor. The 2015 Security and Defence Review outlined London’s intent to buy nine P-8A aircraft, known in RAF service as the Poseidon MRA1. As of November 2020, four aircraft had been handed over, with the type operated from RAF Lossiemouth in the north east of Scotland. Oslo, meanwhile, signed an order for five P-8As in 2017, with the first aircraft anticipated for delivery in 2022. The two countries have committed to working together at the support level, and additionally with the US at the operational level.

Yet, arguably at least as significantly is that both air forces, and in the case of the UK also the Fleet Air Arm, will operate a common combat aircraft type in the F-35. London has a planning figure of 138 aircraft, of which 48 F-35Bs are to be delivered by 2024, while Norway plans to purchase 52 F-35As. And while the present defence and security environment is not a return to the Cold War, Russian activity, particularly in combination with improvements in overall capability, has elicited a response from NATO, including air power.

The RAF is also no stranger to operating in Norway, with squadrons deployed to Norway regularly as part of NATO activity during the Cold War. British Jaguar ground attack aircraft were operated from Bardufoss in the north during training exercises. Cold weather rotary-wing training for the Army and Navy continues from the same air base under the banner of Exercise Clockwork.

There has been much publicity, and debate, over the Royal Navy’s plan to deploy the HMS Queen Elizabeth, its F-35Bs, and supporting warships to the Indo-Pacific in 2021, and the extent to which this reflects a sustainable and therefore credible global maritime power projection capability. This is at least in part a reflection of London’s desire to keep in step with Washington’s strategic emphasis on the Indo-Pacific. What is less in doubt is the importance of the UK Carrier Strike Group in the context of the North Atlantic, and its role in supporting NATO’s northern flank and the Arctic. It is in this context that there would be a clear advantage in yet closer coordination and training between Norway and the UK.

Joint statements on both the P-8A and the F-35 to this effect have been forthcoming from both London and Oslo over the past decade. As both countries begin to field the F-35 and the P-8A, then flesh should begin to be added to the bones of these commitments.
Both aircraft could also benefit from defence-industrial opportunities from closer cooperation. The UK and Norway are both members of the 12-nation strong Northern Group, established by London to support closer defence and security ties. The UK, for instance, has begun to fund integration of the MBDA Meteor active radar-guided air-to-air missile on the F-35B. The Meteor uses a solid propellant booster and a ramjet sustain engine to provide a notably greater kinematic performance than the AIM-120C7 and C8 variants of the US AIM-120 Advanced Medium-Range AAM (AMRAAM). Norway has operated the AMRAAM since it acquired the F-16 and has over the years purchased upgraded versions of the missile. Meanwhile Kongsberg’s Naval Strike Missile (NSM) is a strong candidate in the Royal Navy’s search for a replacement for its ageing RGM-84D Harpoon Block 1C anti-ship missile. The Royal Navy is trying to eke out the service-life of its shipborne Harpoon missiles until 2023. It’s also worth noting that the NSM could provide an anti-ship weapon for the P-8A, while the Joint Strike Missile development of the NSM while not fitting the F-35B internal bay, has been fit checked on external pylons.
It is near 70 years since Norway and the UK have operated not just one of the same but what will be two front line aircraft in the shape of the P-8A and the F-35. Irrespective of the decisions made on the future of European defence-aerospace, and no one should doubt the importance of such decisions, the operational and support benefits of common inventories, when they occur, should not be ignored.

Douglas Barrie is Senior Fellow for Military Aerospace responsible for ensuring the quality of the Institute’s military aerospace analysis and the information on air-power capabilities presented in the flagship Military Balance publication.