Norway’s Next Long-Term Defence Plan: An Allied Perspective

Published every four years, the LTP outlines how the Norwegian Armed Forces, working with wider government and civil society, can address the threats facing Norway and its allies. The LTP addresses defence capability requirements at the operational and strategic level to counter threats from hostile states and non-state actors, both above and below the threshold of open armed conflict. It also outlines how Norway can best improve its societal resilience and civil preparedness to deal with complex risks such as political subversion, cyber-attacks, or climate change in line with its Total Defence Concept.
Considering the Role of Norway’s Allies

While the LTP is, ultimately, a national plan for strengthening Norway’s sovereignty and defence, the Norwegian officials responsible for the LTP process have long recognised the vital role played by allies and partners – as well as the valued contribution that Norway makes to NATO’s collective security and defence in return. A founding member of the Alliance, Norway has been a key player since 1949. The country occupies an important geostrategic position, given its proximity to the Kola Peninsula – Russia’s northern bastion and home to its nuclear submarine fleet – and to the Bear and Greenland-Iceland-UK Gaps that are so essential to securing the North Atlantic. Norway also brings expertise in cold weather operations, as well as high-end capabilities (such as the F-35 stealth fighter) and a widely respected Total Defence Concept that have enabled this small nation to ‘punch above its weight’ in the perceptions of many NATO Allies.

At the same time, previous LTPs have recognised that Norway faces pressing challenges in terms of boosting defence spending and enhancing the readiness of its Armed Forces to deter and defeat aggression, while simultaneously managing other complex challenges such as the systemic risks posed by a rising China or by emerging disruptive technologies. As such, international allies have a strong interest in seeing a strong, credible, and appropriately resourced LTP, as well as understanding what signals Norway is sending about its long-term capability development and investment priorities. This includes opportunities for cooperation with Norway, whether on a bilateral or group basis, for example through joint exercises or training programmes.

To this end, the last LTP in 2020 was accompanied by the publication of a RAND report, commissioned by the Norwegian Ministry of Defence (MOD), which explored allied perspectives on priorities for enhancing defence and deterrence on NATO’s northern flank. Our report explored views on both sides of the Atlantic and outlined five recommendations. Firstly, strengthening deterrence posture in the High North, including boosting cyber capabilities, and expanding the protection of Norwegian bases against missile threats. Secondly, enhancing Norway’s capacity to receive Allied enforcements by increasing the complexity of field exercises and upgrade existing infrastructure, as well as deepening cooperation to enhance interoperability. Thirdly, exploring concepts to hold Norway’s adversaries at risk, such as generating greater mass and persistence for the Armed Forces with unmanned assets, or exploring long-range weaponry and collaboration with Allies on sea denial and littoral strike concepts. Fourthly, enhancing national and societal resilience by continuing to deepen and refine mechanisms for civil support to the military and promoting the whole-of-government approach to defence. And, finally, solidifying contributions to NATO and key partners by continuing to pursue leadership beyond NATO’s northern flank and contribute to rebalancing transatlantic burden-sharing.

Navigating a Deteriorating Security Environment

While these recommendations still offer useful insight, a lot has changed since the 2020 LTP and the RAND research that accompanied it. Norwegian defence has itself moved on, for example by bringing the F-35 into service and continuing to implement modernisation initiatives and reforms. Like the rest of the world, Norway has also been subjected to the COVID-19 pandemic, with all its disruption and lingering economic, social, and health costs. Above all, though, Norway’s external threat environment has deteriorated sharply, most notably due to Russia’s illegal invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 and the security, humanitarian, and economic disaster this war of aggression has brought.

This includes the war’s cascading second- and third-order effects in terms of supply chain disruption, volatile energy markets, and food insecurity, affecting businesses and consumers around the world.
Against this backdrop, domestic pressures are mounting on Western leaders as high inflation tightens its grip on households and businesses, threatening political stability both in and beyond Europe. An increasingly assertive China – as reflected in mounting tensions with the U.S. amidst a trade war and the recent spy balloon scandal – also poses complex new challenges to the rules-based international order that underpins Norway’s economic prosperity and democratic values. Technological innovation has extended this intensifying great power competition to new domains, including cyber and space, posing new opportunities and risks for Norwegian Defence, while climate change continues to reshape the operating environment for the military, including the Arctic.

In this context, it is crucial to understand evolving international perspectives and priorities when developing Norway’s next LTP, given that the NATO Alliance forms the bedrock of Norwegian defence and security. While each of Norway’s allies have their own individual viewpoint and concerns, it is possible to distil a few common considerations. These include changing priorities for NATO in the face of Russia’s aggression in Ukraine, as Allies seek not only to support Kyiv with vital equipment, ammunition, and training, but also to bolster NATO’s own defence and deterrence posture across all domains and flanks. At the same time, Norway must also consider the changing nature of Nordic defence cooperation – not least with the likely accession of Sweden and Finland into NATO and the tangible cooperation opportunities this would present at the bilateral, trilateral, and regional level.

Changing Priorities for NATO

Russia’s invasion has not only devastated Ukraine but also destabilised wider European and global security, necessitating that NATO bolster its own defence and deterrence posture, especially on the eastern flank. At the same time, donations of military aid to Ukraine continue to drain Western stockpiles of military equipment and munitions and to put acute strain on defence industrial supply chains and production lines that are only just starting to gear up to meet the demands of a possible long war. Russia has also sought to intimidate and to undermine NATO’s unity however it can, including through a mix of nuclear ‘sabre-rattling’, the weaponization of migration, energy and food supplies, and a series of alarming activities in both cyberspace and outer space. While largely unsuccessful to date, these coercive measures reflect a new low in NATO-Russia relations, as mirrored also in the deterioration of Norway’s own bilateral engagement with its largest neighbour.

Against this backdrop, Norway’s allies have taken steps to boost their own defence spending, increase the readiness and resilience of their forces, and enhance their national contributions to NATO’s collective security and defence. This has been reflected in a raft of announcements from European allies pledging to meet or surpass NATO’s target of spending two per cent of gross domestic product on defence, as well as in practical initiatives to boost the preparedness of existing military forces – with the head of the British Army likening the current period to the urgent preparations for possible warfighting that occurred ahead of the Second World War, calling this ‘our 1937 moment’. For its part, Norway expects to spend 9.8 per cent more on defence in 2023 than before Russia’s invasion, although the pace of investment in new equipment will be slower than in 2022. Still, allies will look to the next LTP as a test of Oslo’s willingness to invest in the capabilities and wider reforms needed not only for Norwegian security but also to protect the Alliance’s northern flank in the face of an increasingly volatile Russia.

Delivering on these ambitions will also require a revitalised partnership with industry. This is essential not only if Norway and its allies are to continue to support Ukraine with donations, training, and other forms of assistance. It is also vital to replenish Norway’s own stockpiles, to fulfil export orders from other partner countries, and ensure that technological innovation – not least driven by the battlefield lessons of Ukraine – translates into delivery of cutting-edge capabilities to the Armed Forces while also pursuing opportunities to drive down cost wherever possible. This includes pursuing joint programmes with allied nations as a means of generating economies of scale at the industrial level and boosting interoperability at the military level – both vitally important for a small nation such as Norway that needs to extract the most benefit from its finite resources. It also means continuing to reform defence acquisition and to encourage innovation, including by embracing dual use technologies, which have proven so effective in Ukraine (e.g., in the widespread use of modified civilian drones or of Elon Musk’s Starlink satellite communications services).
Enhancing innovation and industrial competitiveness would also present opportunities for Norway to further increase its influence within NATO, including through new initiatives such as the Defence Innovation Accelerator for the North Atlantic (DIANA). In a similar vein, the increased focus across NATO countries on bolstering their resilience and ability to mobilise society to deal with complex issues such as energy insecurity or disruptions to global supply chains presents a golden opportunity for Norway to share the benefits of its long-standing experience in Total Defence.

Crucially, Norway and its allies must try to find the balance between urgently learning the lessons of Ukraine and avoiding the trap of thinking that future conflicts involving NATO will necessarily follow a similar pattern. There is a well-documented tendency in defence to plan for ‘the last war’, while failing to anticipate some other crisis or threat coming over the horizon. There is acute uncertainty over the future outcomes of the Russia-Ukraine War, as well as the future of Russia itself, including what the long term holds for Vladimir Putin’s grip on power. In parallel, the Alliance must also deal with enduring issues such as terrorism and radicalisation, and a growing challenge from China. To this end, Norway’s allies will wish to see Oslo invest in a flexible set of capabilities that enable it to respond quickly to rapid changes in threat, including from an unpredictable Russia, while also contributing not only to Norway’s immediate neighbourhood but also to a ‘360-degree’ approach to NATO’s security.

Changing priorities for Nordic Defence Cooperation

Along with a changing NATO, Norway’s next LTP must also reflect the evolving dynamics of Nordic Defence Cooperation. This affects the prospects not only for NORDEFCO, but also for bilateral and trilateral engagement with Norway’s Nordic neighbours (and external players such as the U.S. or UK). One of the many seismic changes brought about by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been the application of both Sweden and Finland to join NATO – overturning the two countries’ long record of military non-alignment. At the time of writing, formal accession is still pending amidst ongoing negotiations with Turkey, who has especially objected to the Swedish bid and accused Stockholm of harbouring members of what Ankara considers to be Kurdish terror groups. In parallel, however, both countries continue to negotiate Defence Cooperation Agreements (DCAs) with the U.S, to work closely with the UK-led Joint Expeditionary Force (JEF) and to take other practical measures, such as joint exercises, towards strengthening cooperation and interoperability with NATO Allies.

If Turkey refuses to accept Sweden and/or Finland’s bids, Norway (and others in the Alliance) will need to decide whether to offer new security guarantees and how best to integrate these partner countries short of NATO membership. Conversely, if Turkey does accept the two countries’ membership in NATO – likely after the Turkish presidential elections and NATO’s Vilnius Summit – this will present lots of opportunities for deeper defence cooperation in the Nordic and wider Nordic-Baltic region. This includes joint defence planning, shared domain awareness (esp. in the air and maritime domains), development of a common approach towards Arctic security, and a broader shift in NATO thinking to encompass a revised role for Norway as a reception and staging point for allied reinforcements flowing towards Sweden and Finland in the event of any future war.

At the same time, the possible accession of Sweden and Finland to NATO has consequences for other frameworks besides NORDEFCO. This includes the Northern Group and the UK-led JEF, which would become NATO-only clubs, reenergising debates about the possible risks of a regionalisation of NATO. Similarly, accession would raise the possibility of an informal Nordic bloc within the Alliance, with both political and practical consequences. While Norway may wish to avoid the perception of such a bloc, conscious of its commitment to a ‘360-degree’ approach to NATO’s collective security, Norwegian officials may wish to share the benefit of their lengthy experience navigating and making the most of NATO decision making processes and structures to help upskill Swedish and Finnish counterparts, for whom this will be a new challenge.

At the same time, the next LTP will need to consider the consequences for other non-military governance-focused institutions involving Norway, such as the Arctic Council, which could soon find itself populated by all NATO countries except Russia (currently the subject of a boycott, due to the Ukraine War). The resumption or further breakdown of cooperation on issues such as Arctic shipping or search and rescue would directly impact Norwegian defence, while wider shifts in geopolitical tensions in the Arctic may affect the risks posed not only by Russia but also by China, which has expressed growing interest in the region as a self-styled ‘Near-Arctic State’.

Implications for Norway

The challenges facing the authors of Norway’s next LTP are complex, acute, and wide-ranging. With geostrategic competition reaching its highest intensity since the Cold War, extraordinary demands are being placed on defence officials, who must manage a myriad of external threats while seeking to bolster national defence, revitalise ties with industry, boost innovation, and navigate the complex web of overlapping cooperation frameworks of which Norway is today a part. While Norway enjoys greater economic prosperity, in per capita terms, than many of its NATO Allies, Oslo’s efforts to increase defence spending and support for Ukraine have also encountered domestic resistance. Norway’s resources, whether financial, military, or political, are ultimately finite. It is thus for the next LTP to clarify the country’s priorities for the coming years and thereby provide the necessary guidance to investments, reform initiatives and international cooperation. This includes assessing whether certain issues are best addressed through bilateral, Nordic, or NATO frameworks to maximise the tangible benefits of cooperation to both Norway and its partners. With a war in Europe, a rising China, and a host of other systemic issues to tackle, allies are looking to the next LTP to chart a course that will navigate Norwegian defence through the tumultuous 2020s.