Deterrence and ­Reassurance in the High North

We must pursue a policy based on credible defence based on member­ship in NATO and at the same time reassurance and dialogue with Russia. This will be increasingly difficult because of (1) the changes taking place in the High North and (2) the rapid technological changes. We have not invested in survivability and resilience for a long time. Thus, there is a concern that we may enter a situation where there might be an incentive for a first strike. Norway has vulnerabilities both in the military system and in the civil society that can be exploited by an adversary. Crisis management will also be a huge challenge, also because of the proliferation of social media and fake news.

The distinction between peace and war becomes more blurred. Our open society is more vulnerable to cyber warfare and hybrid techniques. We must take necessary measures to protect our ability to act timely both militarily and in the civilian sector in situations where we are exposed to hybrid and cyber warfare. We should also raise the awareness in our population about the nature and effects that could confront us all in a crisis. Even though the situation today is very different from the situation in the Cold War, the need for understanding, engagement and awareness in the public is the same.

Deterrence and reassurance

During the first two decades after the end of the Cold War, our focus was almost exclusively on deployed ­operations and crisis management. A return to a focus on high-intensity warfare and deterrence requires a very different mindset particularly in the officer corps.

We know that such a war in Europe would be disastrous, and our focus must be on deterrence and to prevent war. Deterrence by prevention or by punishment is a common way of describing alternative approaches to security. In reality, we have to plan for a combination of the two. Our posture and policy must contribute to stability and predictability, or reassurance, which has been the more traditional label on our policies in the High North. Therefore, deterrence and reassurance will still be guiding principles for Norwegian security ­policy. In a new security situation with increasing ­military build-up in northwest Russia and rapid techno­logical changes, we have to consider carefully how we can maintain a favourable security situation in our area. The proliferation of unmanned auto­nomous vehicles for use under the surface as well as air drones and the use of artificial intelligence represent a challenge to the maintenance of political control in crises. We need to study how we can cope with these challenges both nationally and in an Allied context.

From the Norwegian side, we started early to argue for the need to revitalise collective defence in NATO. Already in 2008, we launched an initiative for raising NATO’s profile in the member states. At an informal defence ministerial in London, June 2008, the then Norwegian Minister of Defence, Anne Grete Strøm-Erichsen, presented a paper on raising NATO’s profile in the member states. The main agenda was to better balance ‘out-of-area’ operations with ‘in-area’ activities, acknowledging that there was an urgent need to revitalise the key concept of deterrence and ­collective defence. She argued that NATO needed an improved situational awareness and better linkage to the national military commands, and that ­NATO’s military organisation should be more involved in training and exercises. The paper highlighted a sense that NATO was drifting in a direction where its relevance to the defence of the member states was becoming questionable. At that time, political and military developments in Russia clearly did not signal a move towards greater cooperation with the West. This was followed by the war in Georgia in 2008, and the intervention into Ukraine six years thereafter.

The 2008 war in Georgia represented a ­major ­setback for Moscow’s relations with NATO and demonstrated the many deficiencies in the Russian armed forces. As a result, the Russian government launched a massive effort to modernise the Russian armed forces, placing emphasis on new equipment, readiness, and command and control. From 2008, Russia started to take a more forward-leaning stand both politically and militarily. President Vladimir Putin was adamant about re-establishing Russia as a great power. With the State Armaments Program 2020, Russia set very ambitious targets for its armed forces: in particular, a goal of replacing 70 per cent of its weapons systems with new ones. A sharp increase in defence spending resulted in new weapons systems, higher readiness and a new extensive training and ­exercise pattern. Although the decline in oil prices from 2014 and other factors have since forced it to moderate its ambitions, Russia still gives very high priority to its armed forces and their modernisation.

Credible collective defense

A decade ago, the command arrangements in NATO and member nations were mainly focused on deployed operations, the operational planning for the defence of the member countries was almost non-existent and the indication and warning systems were inactive.

Today, the situation has improved a lot. The Russian ­aggression against Crimea and the Ukraine set off strong reactions in NATO and Allied capitals. These efforts have been most useful also for Norway; we are dependent on Allied reinforcements. Our ­Norwegian forces and Allied reinforcements will together ­constitute deterrence and, if necessary, defence.

There is now more realistic and compre­hensive contingency planning based on a theatre-wide ­perspective. NATO has agreed to establish a new joint forces command in Norfolk to focus on the sea lines of communications and the North Atlantic. The United States has decided to re-establish the Second Fleet. These steps are vital for the credibility of the ­collective defence in Europe and particularly in our area and for transatlantic cohesion in crises and war. With ­contingency planning, a number of important elements follow in a credible collective defence effort:

• Adjustment of command arrangements for crisis management and operations. The ­situation has ­improved a lot, but there is still need for ­improvements. We must make better use of national command and control resources like the joint headquarters in Bodø. And we must facilitate coordination with civil emergency authorities in a better way.

• The readiness level of NATO and Norwegian forces is not good enough. The situation is better now than before, but not enough to match the requirement. The 4-30 initiative is a timely and necessary step to improve our collective capability for deterrence and ­defence. Forward deployment to Finnmark and more Allied military presence including permanent ­rotational training of USMC units improve the situation.

• Trident Juncture 2018 was an Article 5 exercise arranged by NATO, and such exercises make it possible for NATO’s military leadership to gain experience and incorporate lessons learned into operational planning. The fact that Allied Command Operations takes on a more prominent role in such exercises will add credibility and competence to deal with crisis management and collective defence. Coalitions or single countries have arranged many of the larger exercises in Europe, although in the public domain they have been labelled NATO exercises. This has been unfortunate and has weakened the possibility for NATO’s operational leader­ship to gain experience and get more insight into the status of the forces allocated to them. With the current reforms, this will be much better.

Grey areas and new technology

In the current security situation, we must expect extensive use of hybrid techniques and cyber warfare in a tense situation, which may lead to the use of military forces. Well-educated citizens who trust the authorities and legislation which gives the relevant authorities possibilities to act timely are the best assurances. In this regard, we are in a relatively good position to handle unforeseen situations. However, we need to train and develop procedures and awareness. Finland has established a centre of excellence where Norway also participates. This is a good initiative. Furthermore, we must reinforce the link and cooperation between the Ministry of Defence and civil emergency. In Norway, we are about to revitalise the total defence concept, which will be useful in all grey-zone scenarios.

Transition from peace to crises or war will be very difficult in a modern society. I believe we have in place a good legal basis for precautionary measures. Warning time could be short, and we must prepare to act fast. New weapons systems have a long range and high precision. Allied reinforcements should preferably be in place before the commencements of hostilities. In ­addition, we must establish unity of command in order to do effective crisis management operations in an ­Allied context. This means that we must transfer ­command to Allied military authorities. Therefore, we have insisted that NATO must have an adequate ­command and control organisation capable of conducting complicated operations based on political guidance.

Readiness is more important than before. It includes a willingness and an ability to take decision at all levels, including at the political level. Russia has shown its capability in this regard both in Crimea and Georgia, and the snap exercises demonstrate high readiness in their armed forces. We have to be prepared to cope with this readiness.

Robust and reliable alliance

Throughout NATO’s history, critics have questioned whether NATO would be able to act collectively on short notice in an emergency threatening the integrity of member states’ territory. Of course, I hope we will never face such situations. I think it would be a grave mistake for potential aggressors to underestimate the solidarity in the Alliance. There are no obstacles for individual Allies to take unilateral actions to act in smaller coalitions in such circumstances. This makes the Allied framework very robust and reliable. After the aggression against Crimea, individual Allies implemented several visible and effective measures in order to strengthen deterrence in Europe, The U.S. implemented substantial efforts to strengthen the defence of Europe after 2014. These measures include many investments and activities in Norway and surrounding areas. The United States is strongly committed to the collective defence but insists on better burden sharing. This insistence has broad support across the political spectrum in the United States.

NATO’s heads of states and governments have stated that NATO will remain a nuclear Alliance as long as nuclear weapons exist. From the height of the Cold War, the number of nuclear weapons in Europe have diminished by more than 90 percent. The Allied posture today is very limited and stable in the sense that we will not face the old dilemma of “use them or lose them.” It is still very unlikely that NATO will ever encounter a situation where we must consider deliberate escalation by first use of these weapons. There is not much hope to restore an effective arms control arrangement for short- and intermediate-range nuclear forces. I do, however, believe it should be possible to maintain an agreement for strategic forces. Extended deterrence continues to be a basic element in transatlantic security.

The Nordics

Nordic defence cooperation is growing, and this adds to deterrence and defence in our area. Despite the fact that Sweden and Finland are not members of NATO, while the other three Nordic countries are, no country can challenge our security without risking a broad and concerted response from the Western world. The cooperation is most visible in exercises such as Trident Juncture and Arctic Challenge Exercise (ACE). This year ACE was more comprehensive – and achieved so-called flag-level exercise for the first time. In November last year, the ministers of defence signed a vision ­document for 2025, which says, “We will improve our defence ­capability and cooperation in peace, crises and conflict”. We have established secure ­communication between our Ministries of Defence, and we work closely together on the military and ministerial levels. We will also try to expand the Nordic cooperation in supplies and support. We depend on imports, much of which come via Gothenburg in Sweden. We have long and vulnerable lines of communications in our country, and Nordic cooperation in this regard offers a great advantage. This is perhaps even more important for support to the civilian population in crisis or war.

The security situation in our area as well as in the wider European and global context is complex and un­predictable. There is no direct threat in the military sense, but many factors could challenge the ­un­precedented stability and peace we have gotten used to in the Western world.

The most basic of these is the adherence to basic values. More authoritarian regimes seem to progress over more traditional democratic rule. Our ­societies are under pressure from large-scale migration and ­globalisation. Populist and nationalist parties gain ­support, most probably as a reaction to this develop­ment. The international institutions, which have ­contributed to prosperity and peace, could be undermined. It seems that Russia is doing its ­utmost to ­reinforce this development. Western cohesion and ­solidarity is critical for the maintenance of peace, security and prosperity. China’s rapid military and ­economic growth represents a number of new ­challenges for everybody in the West. The U.S. security strategy identifies China and Russia as the two peer rivals. If they act together, it will make it even more difficult for us in the West to defend our position in the global competition. This could also have significant implications for the situation in the Arctic and thereby direct consequences for Norwegian security.

In conclusion, the defence and security posture in Norway is essential for NATO’s ability to operate in the north western part of the Atlantic and to establish a sufficient degree of sea control to allow reinforcements and supplies to be shipped from North America to Europe in crises or war. Norway will do its part, but better overall coordination and command is required in order to get the full benefits of collective defence. All countries in this area profit from cooperation in the Arctic. The Western approach to security in the Atlantic should not cause more tension or ­misunderstanding. However, NATO’s policies must be ­predictable and firm. The objective is security and defence, not ­confrontation. With the rapid climate change, many see a change in the security priorities, particularly in the younger generations. We have to be open-­minded and accept that security is not limited to military issues. Our concept of security must thus be wider and incorporate non-traditional threats and challenges.