Considerations for NATO’s Third CAOC
The decision to establish a new Combined Air Operations Centre (CAOC) in Norway represents a defining development within NATO’s command architecture. The Alliance will anchor an air C2 node above the Arctic Circle – emplaced precisely in the region where climate change, strategic competition, and military activity converge with increasing speed.
The Belgian Major General Harold Van Pee, former Commander of CAOC Uedem (2021-2024), offers valuable perspectives on the opportunities and structural implications of this new headquarters. His views reflect operational experience, combined with understanding of both the strengths and constraints inherent in NATO Command Structure (NCS).
From Nordic Aspiration to NATO Integration
Van Pee noted that early Nordic thinking envisioned a primarily NATO Force Structure (NFS) Air Operations Centre (AOC), shaped by regional partnership rather than Alliance-wide participation. However, as he observes, such a model was unlikely ever to materialise under the NATO Command Structure with the outlined ambition level.
“In the early days of development, some believed the AOC could be achieved as a Nordic construct alone. But given the ambition level set, an NCS entity always seemed the logical conclusion to me. However, an NCS entity requires multinational integration, and that inevitably brings broader participation, wider regulation, and external expectations”, Van Pee says.
In practice, this means Norway must prepare for the organisational complexity that accompanies multinational staffing. Variations in labour law, duty periods, leave frameworks and national caveats do not disappear in a NATO environment; they intensify. Commanders must therefore plan for productivity and shift structures shaped not by ideal design, but by what is administratively possible.
A third CAOC increases redundancy. It enhances resilience. And it provides NATO with a permanent C2 node in the High North—a space where security competition is intensifying and where air operations generate strategic effect
This is the price you pay for being international. In Uedem we had 21 different nations. It is enriching but can be somewhat inefficient at times. As CAOC Commander, you have to live with that. It is challenging, but in the end, it is worth it”.
An example from the Pandemic in CAOC Uedem was when different COVID rules applied across the 21 nations, as well as German civilian national, German civilian regional, and German military Bundeswehr regulations. It is a challenging environment for a NATO Commander, which is essential to take into consideration. On daily basis, each nation has different working hours, especially for working shifts to ensure constant readiness. There is a need to find the lowest common denominator and build from there. This point serves both a warning and an opportunity to get ahead of the curve. A commander who understands the friction points early can set the conditions for success, the major general tells LUFTLED.
Personnel as the Determinant of Operational Credibility
While the establishment of CAOC North was not achieved by redistributing personnel away from Uedem and Torrejon – a development Van Pee considers essential – he underlines that generating and sustaining the required human capital remains the decisive factor. An initial concern was that the personnel allocation and distribution could have been divided between the three CAOCs, based on the number that already existed. Fortunately, a solution to that issue has been found.
“The uplift in PE (peacetime establishment) was the correct choice, compared to splitting up what we had at Uedem and Torrejon. But the ability to fill those roles—particularly above the Arctic Circle—will determine whether the headquarters is fully effective,” he continues.
Retention and recruitment challenges are amplified in Arctic conditions, where lifestyle factors, family integration and living cost become operational variables. Host-nation support and community integration will therefore be as significant as technical systems or infrastructure upgrades. Success, he suggests, depends not only on the quality of the command node, but on whether allied personnel are willing to serve there.
The Baltic Sea: A New Coordination Boundary
Among Van Pee’s most substantive concerns is the operational seam now introduced between CAOC Norway and CAOC Uedem. The Baltic Sea – historically one of NATO’s most active air policing environments – now includes two joint operational areas (JOAs). This boundary is strategically sensitive.
“The dividing line between CAOCs in northern Europe is now placed somewhere in the Baltic Sea – exactly where coordination needs to be seamless and where you do not want such a coordination line.”
Van Pee has previously advocated for a JOA construct that ensures coherence across northern Europe and the Baltic region. This still remains an important point. An additional JOA and fourth CAOC could potentially have been an even better structure than the current three JOA and three CAOC design. Day-to-day peacetime coordination may be manageable through rotational responsibilities or procedural workarounds. Wartime integration, however, cannot rely on improvisation. This requires deliberate study, rehearsal and procedural alignment well ahead of crisis escalation.
The headquarters strengthens NATO’s credibility in a region where Russian activity is persistent and situational awareness is paramount. Its presence in the North signal’s commitment, reinforces deterrence and integrates Finland and Sweden into a coherent northern air domain
Redundancy, Deterrence and Strategic Presence in the North
Despite the challenges identified, Van Pee’s overall assessment supports the establishment of the Northern CAOC unequivocally:
“A third CAOC increases redundancy. It enhances resilience. And it provides NATO with a permanent C2 node in the High North – a space where security competition is intensifying and where air operations generate strategic effect.”
The headquarters strengthens NATO’s credibility in a region where Russian activity is persistent and situational awareness is paramount. Its presence in the North signal’s commitment, reinforces deterrence and integrates Finland and Sweden into a coherent northern air domain.
Participation from across NATO will be required for the headquarters to reach full maturity and operational capability. Some nations remain hesitant, Belgium among them, but Van Pee argues that absence also constitutes a risk within the future F-35-enabled northern air ecosystem and that nations should prioritize presence in the High North.
Recommendations for Norway and NATO Leadership
From Van Pee’s reflections, four imperatives become apparent to take into consideration:
- Prepare for multinational complexity. NCS headquarters operate under the friction of varying national regulations. Personnel frameworks must be understood early to avoid structural inefficiency.
- Treat recruitment and retention as operational priorities. The CAOC’s credibility rests on its ability to sustain a 24/7 battle rhythm with skilled operators – national and international.
- Address the Baltic coordination seam proactively. Air C2 boundaries must not become operational vulnerabilities. Coherence and cross-CAOC integration require rehearsed mechanisms, not ad-hoc solutions.
- Make CAOC North a place allies actively choose to invest in. The multinational commitment will be essential.
Conclusion: A Strategic Node at the Edge of the Alliance
CAOC Bodø is more than an administrative expansion; it is a strategic recalibration of NATO’s air command architecture. Its success will depend not solely on capability, but on coordination, culture, and the collective will of nations to participate meaningfully in the High North.
Van Pee concludes by expressing optimism, tempered by the clarity of experience:
“This is the right step for NATO. The High North needs a CAOC. Now the task is to ensure it develops into the headquarters we require—not only in concept, but in practice.”
